Now this is certainly true. Indeed I don’t think it’s important for me to even pretend to have any say in my government. This is quite different from “declaring myself a slave.” Then again, the more I think about that particular argument, the more I think you may have been on to something with that one. Unfortunately, to the extent that this is true, everybody seems to agree that we all are in fact slaves (to the tyranny of the majority, should the majority decide to be tyrants), so my sin apparently consists of having the bad taste to “state” what we all know to be true. Since people who don’t vote are treated no differently from people who do, obviously if I am “declaring myself a slave,” then I am also declaring everybody else a slave as well.

It says you are okay with the idea that you are not in any way part of the governing “mechanism” under which you live (i.e., that you are merely a subject, and therefore reject either the idea that you live in a “democracy” — a “rule of the people” or the idea that you are part of the “people” who rule the democratic system in which you live).

This is going too far. My right to vote is very important, irrespective of whether I actually exercise the franchise or not. In no way, by not voting, am I declaring that I am not a part of the “people” who rule the democratic system. If I were, say, to renounce my American citizenship (which only a ridiculous sum of money and a guarantee of citizenship in some other tolerable country could possibly induce me to do), then I would be saying what you claim I am saying. I can imagine circumstances in which I would certainly vote; these circumstances have not yet existed in my lifetime, but perhaps one day they will do.

Interesting. So it’s rational to get 500 people to do something irrational? *grin* Maybe it is. That’s fascinating.

It can certainly be rational to get other people to do irrational things. If I am running a poor inefficient shop and I’m getting my butt kicked by my competitor across the street, it would be perfectly rational of me to convince him to close up shop and cede his clientele to me. Whether I have any hope of actually convincing him is another matter.

I had never considered whether the belief that things have tele (that is, that things have “natures,” and that it is of the nature of every thing to actualize its nature; or to put it another way, that the primary dictum of ethics is, “Become yourself”) entails the belief that otherwise-immoral actions might legitimately be treated as amoral or good depending on the goal which they are meant to accomplish.

It doesn’t seem to me that there is any such entailment.

You may be making a distinction which I am not familiar with people making. Teleology comes from the Greek for “science of ends.” Most philosophers (though not all) use teleological and consequentialist interchangeably. The usual view of teleological ethics is that what matters is the total consequences or ends of an action. Contrast with deontological ethics which holds that the moral rightness of an action is independent of whether it has good or evil consequences. This debate is, I believe, virtually the only debate which is actually about morality rather than facts.

However, if you are operating under a different definition of teleology, that’s perfectly acceptable. You’ll forgive my confusion, I hope.

You are quite correct that we do have a factual dispute here. I do say that the purpose of voting is to influence one’s government. I am not 100% clear what you believe the purpose of voting is. Expressing yourself, being a part of a mythology, and performing a duty to the patriotic dead seem to be the major candidates, but I don’t wish to put words in your mouth.

Thanks!!! :-D

“Having a say” is purposely ambiguous. :-)

I wish to deny no previous assertion I’ve made about teleology.

I had never considered whether the belief that things have tele (that is, that things have “natures,” and that it is of the nature of every thing to actualize its nature; or to put it another way, that the primary dictum of ethics is, “Become yourself”) entails the belief that otherwise-immoral actions might legitimately be treated as amoral or good depending on the goal which they are meant to accomplish.

It doesn’t seem to me that there is any such entailment.

One factual claim which you make which someone (i.e., I) has/have been disputing is the claim that voting’s purpose is to influence government.

I don’t think your not voting says anything universal, necessarily. I think it says that you don’t think it’s important for you to even pretend to have any “say” in your government.

It says you are okay with the idea that you are not in any way part of the governing “mechanism” under which you live (i.e., that you are merely a subject, and therefore reject either the idea that you live in a “democracy” — a “rule of the people” or the idea that you are part of the “people” who rule the democratic system in which you live).

Anyway, that’s the way I have to interpret You say it’s okay with you that you “have no say” at all in who your government is, that it’s okay for other people to pick your government for you, that it’s simply okay for other people to tell you what to do. Since we agree that I have no say in who my government is whether I vote or not, that other people will pick my government whether I vote or not, and that other people will tell me what to do whether I vote or not. You must be saying, then, that I am saying, by not voting, that it’s okay if my right to vote is taken away.

I do agree that the connection between “wrong” and “irrational” are contingent. I argued that voting was irrational. I never said it was wrong. Indeed, as I said above, I think the people who argue that it is wrong are mistaken. Voting is no wronger than rooting for one’s sports team and appears to give the same psychological comfort to many people. I do not happen to be one of those people. By all means, continue to vote if you enjoy it. Your chances of dying on the way to the polls are fairly small and you’re taking a reasonably light risk for any activity which provides some marginal enjoyment. And I have certainly noticed that a great many people seem to take enormous pleasure in voting. More power to them. I am not so blessed. (I wish I were; the more not-immoral activities one finds pleasurable, the better, it seems to me.)

As for your teleological position, I was going off one post you wrote in which you expressed your approval of and agreement with Aristotle’s teleology. I won’t hold you to it if you don’t think that statement actually reflects your views. I noticed it only because that is one position on which I disagree with Aristotle. My own moral philosophy is deontological (though not Kantian). I agree with you on the importance of duty. Indeed, I think it’s the only thing of much importance. I just do not intuit a duty to vote, despite many, many people trying to instill such a sense of duty into me.

There is no necessary tension between a teleological and deontological morality in most situations. The major tension comes when one considers whether the ends justify the means. The teleologist must say that it does. The deontologist is not obligated to do so. Whether the ends justifies the means is, I believe, one of the only genuine moral debates. Most apparent debates about morals are actually debates about facts. (Curiously, this voting/non-voting argument does appear to be a genuine debate about morals rather than about facts. Nobody appears to be disputing my factual analysis. They are instead claiming that there is a duty to vote just as there is a duty to honesty, loyalty, etc.)

The reason I mentioned Kantianism is because the entirety of your first point seemed to be an argument that an act (such as not voting) must say something universal. I deny that this is true. In fact, the only philosophy I am expressing is a very particular and quite limited one. I am no more saying nobody should vote by not voting than I was saying everybody should marry my wife when I married my wife.

First, my arguments are for those who want to vote, but are afraid they would be wrong to do so because it is “irrational.” They are meant to show that the connection between “irrational” and “wrong” is contingent.

Even if you assume the point of voting is to influence something, and therefore that voting is irrational [because it in fact influences nothing], that does not necessarily constitute an argument against voting.

And if you see things as I (evidently) do, you realize that thinking the point of voting is to influence something is to misunderstand the nature of voting. And, therefore, to think that voting’s not influencing anything somehow constitutes an argument against its being done is to yourself be mistaken.

I didn’t know I saw things that way until you got me thinking about it with your response to this post, though, so this has been fun. Thanks! :-)

Second, I have no idea whether we’ve switched sides on the issues of teleology and deontology, or whether I’ve been on any side here on this blog. I hadn’t thought about it. Hmmm . . . .

I’ve always thought the one constant in life was duty. All the teleology stuff is stuff I’ve come to through my being around so many Aristotelians.

You have duties because of what/who you are. What/who you are determines your telos. I see no tension between the two, but maybe that’s because I’m tired.

Third, I’m not sure about whether I’m being a Kantian, or what exactly the issue is with “expressiveness.”

Finally, isn’t it the case that you may influence the country, but do not in fact participate in its politics (unless one of the people you convince in conversation is a politician)?

It seems to me that only politicians (and those who influence them) are actually involved in politics, on your understanding of democracy (since no one’s vote actually makes any difference in her/his nation’s politics).

Talking about something with other people who aren’t involved in something is different than participating in that something.